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Existing institutions 1l11OCQting WQter in Odifomisl reflect prior appropriation
WIller rights established whm water was abundant. These allOCJltion rules qutut
users and do no! encourage water conservation. IncreJlSed WIller SCQrcity and
gruwing valuation of ware,'s tmvironmental benefits are indUcing a transition to
water allOCQtion mechanisms llull increase Waler efficiency in agriculture.
Transferable rights systems
lead to market-Wee water allocation, induce farmers

wm

to adopt water conservation technology, and may not face strong objection from
senior waler rights holders. One must weigh the efficiency gains associated with
transition from water rights to waler markets against the transaction costs
associated with installing facilities that enable water exchange and trading.
Transition to water markets may preserw the agricultural sedor's well-being
while Qllowing tk transfer of somt water outside of agriculture-in particular,
for environmentill benefit. 'I'he cost of policitS proposed to mIua agricultural
water supply whilt encouraging water trading a~ invtrstly ~lattd to tlu atent
of trading aflowtd. 1hL mo~ farmers trade water, the less costly mIucing wattr
supply is to agricultu~. Policies reducing water supply to Cmtral Valley P10jtd
amtractors and allowing trading only amcmg tMst amtnzdors a~ much mo~
apmsivt than a~ policitS otClJunzging trading among all agricultural wattr u~rs
in Ozlifomia.

I.

INTRODUCTION

The increasing difficulty (and cost) of
expanding water resources and increasing
urban and environmental demand for
water are inducing changes in California's
*The authors are, respectively, Professor, Depart
ment of AltriculturaJ and ResouKe Economics, Uni·
versity of Calltomia, 'Berkeley; Graduate Student, De
partment of Agricultural and ResouKe Economkt,
Univen.ity of California, Berkeley; Assistant Profft$Of,
Department of Agricultural and Re:soun:e Economics,
University of Connecticut. This is a revised version of
a paper presented It the Westem EcononUc Associa
tion IntematiONl! Conference, San Francisco, Calif.,
Ju.ly 13, 1992 in a .eSlion organized by Mlrk
Kanazawa, Cuieton College, Northfield,. MinI\. The
IUthors thMUt Mark Kanazawa. Ron Teeples, Muon
Gaffney, Unda Fernandez, and Quid Sunding for
their useful cotrunenb. 'I'hb paper is Gi&nnini foun
dation Paper No. lon (for rt!print identification
only). The .tudy wu partially .upported by the EPA
and BARD and a National Sctenc'l! Foundation Gnrod
\late Fellowship. Any opinions, findings, conclu
,iON, or recommendatiem. art! the authors' and do
not necusarily reflect the views of the NatiON! Sci
ence Foundation.

water policies. Agriculture accounts for 75
percent of all water used in the state.
Farmers use traditional irrigation technol·
ogies and apply much of this water to
lands with relatively low-value crops,
such as pasture and alfalfa. The challenge
is to design viable and effective reforms
that will divert water from agriculture to
alternative uses. 1his paper explains exist
ing patterns of California water use and
evaluates the alternative reform
mechanisms' potential to divert water away
from agricultural to nonagricultural uses.
The paper describes California's exist
ing water allocation mechanisms and de
velops a theoretical argument identifying
Abbftviation.
CVP: CentRI Valley

Pro;ect

ET: Evapotranspiration
SWP: State Water Prc;ect

conditions under which transition to a
market-like allocation system can improve
social welfare and reduce agricultural
water use without threatening agricultural
viability. The potential for gains in effi
ciency is much larger when all agricultural
water users participate in the market ar
rangement. Solutions advocating market
like behavior for only some users have
limited potential for economic gains.
II.

WATEA ALLOCATION MECHANISMS IN
CAUFOANIA

Water allocation mechanisms deter
mine water price and distribution to indi
vidual users. In California, a myriad of
water allocation arrangements have
evolved. The analysis here considers only
the most prevalent arrangements pertain
ing to surface water. Including groundwa
ter considerations would complicate the
analysis without affecting the conclusions.
The most important point is that the exist
ing system does not yield an allocation
pattern that would be achieved through a
competitive market. That is to say,
California's water allocation rules do not
produce a market-clearing price that
equates supply with demand. Instead, the
rules generally are based. on a queuing"
system that disallows the transfer or trad
ing of water rights.
In California, prior appropriation and,
to a lesser extent, riparian rights doctrines
determine rights to \'fater from" old"
sources. These doctrines apply to most
sources developed since the 19th century,
except for state and federal water projects.
According to Cuzon (1983), two rules
characterize prior appropriation: "first
come, first served" and "use it or lose it."
Following the prior-appropriation queue,
farmers receive water rights according to
whm they start diverting water. Although
policy prevents users from transferring
(selling) water, it does not restrict the
amount of water they divert and allows
them to use as much waterlQ.S they can put
to beneficial use.
M

The riparian system in practice is an
other queuing system but bases allocation
on location. Growers located along a river
or a stream can use as much water as they
need to irrigate their fields, but they can
not divert water away from the river. The
riparian system initially appeared on the
East Coast where the large number of riv
ers made diverting water (ar from the
river banks generally unnecessary. How
ever, in the West, the relatively smaller
number of rivers necessitates diverting
much water with aqueducts. The West
thus adopted the prior appropriation sys
tem relying on historical rights as a guid
ing principle. Burness and Quirk (1979)
discuss advantages of efficiency gains as
sociated with transition from a riparian
rights to a prior appropriation system for
water allocation based on a variation of
the prior appropriation rules. Under the
Central Valley Project (CVP) and the State
Water Project (5WP), recipients of this
water (·contractors·) receive contracts
specifying the volume and price of water
(or a specific time period up to 40 years.
Contractors cannot trade water. In princi
ple, the pricing of project water recaptures
operating and capital investment costs. In
practice, CVP water has been notoriously
cheap. (However, since 1987 prices have
increased. substantially. In 1992, Westlands
Water District paid about $70 per acre
foot.) Agricultural SWP users have junior
rights relative to the Southern California
metropolitan district. Agricultural users
and CVP water contractors have junior
rights relative to exchange contractors
that is, individuals who have prior appro
priation rights for bodies of water that
were dammed and diverted as part of the
CVP.

Arguably, the existing water rights sys
tem in the California Central Valley effec
tively encouraged settlement and expan
sion of the state's irrigated land base.
Water allocation rules-particularly in the
case of the prior appropriation doctrine
are comparable to homesteading in en

couraging settlement and land ownership.
Allen (1991) demonstrates the economic
rationale behind homesteading. One can
use similar arguments to justify prior ap
propriation rights. In the early stages of
land settlement, prior appropriation rights
enabled farmers to obtain water for a low
price. Since the price was so low, farmers
did not need to establish extensi.ve diver
sion facilities and could invest in inputs
other than water.
Land markets replaced homesteading
once the West was settled and new land
became unavailable. To date, no compara·
ble transition has occurred with regard to
water resources. One reason is because
California reached land constraints before
water constraints, and until recently water
was abundant. Additionally, differences in
the nature of land and water make estab·
lishing water markets more difficult. Land
is a tangible commodity characterized by
its fixity. On the other hand, water's criti
cal characteristic is its flow, which can be
volatile. This characteristic makes vesting
rights difficult and also complicates estab
lishing mechanisms that produce market
like outcomes. Furthermore, increasing re
turns to scale in providing and managing
water conveyance systems may lead to
water supply monopolies. This pOSSibility
suggests that regulated utilities or other
publicly controlled organizations should
ensure that water pricing is efficient and
competitive.
Ill.

THE ECONOMICS OF TRANSITION FROM
WATER RIGHTS TO WATER MARKETS

Most California water allocation mech
anisms tend to queue users, to restrict
water transfer and water trading, and to
charge prices that do not adequately re
flect the water's scarcity value. Shah and
Zilberman (1992) develop a conceptual
framework for analyzing the economics of
transition from queuing systems to water
markets. The framework is especially ap
plicable to the prior appropriation system.
The analysis relies on Caswell and

Zilberman's (1986) and Dinar and
Zilberman's (1991) irrigation choice mod
els. These models assume that agricultural
production has a constant return to scale.
They concentrate on the choice of water
and irrigation technology and assume that
output is a function of effective water and
irrigation technology. Effective water is
water that the crop uses. Evapotranspira
tion (ET) is a common measure of con
sumptive water use.
Effective water is a function of applied
water and can be strongly influenced by
irrigation technology, especially in areas
where applied water losses due to deep
percolation and runoff are more likely to
occur. Modem irrigation technology (for
example, drip and sprinkler) can improve
the uniformity of water application and
thus increase the efficient delivery of
water to the plant's root zone, thereby in·
creasing the proportion of effective water
to applied water. Irrigation scheduling
prevents overirrigation that may occur
with simple gravitational technologies
such as flood or furrow irrigation. The
gains associated with modern irrigation
technologies increase as environmental
conditions become less favorable to tradi
tional irrigation technologies. For exam
ple, sandy soil or uneven land leads to
substantial deep percolation or runoff
losses.
Figures 1 and 2 present results of the
Caswell-Zilberman (CZ) model. Figure 1
depicts the marginal productivity of the
modem technology (MP"l) and of the tra
ditional technology (MP1). Assume that
the marginal productivities are decreasing
and may be negative with excessive irri·
gation (when applied water is greater than
a'h under the traditional technology and
aN under the modem technology.) Assume
also that the modem technology produces
the same (or slightly higher) maximum
output per acre than does the traditional
technology and requires less water to
reach its maximum yield (aft <a'h). Thus,
when applied water is smaller than at, the
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modern technology's marginal productiv
ity is higher. However, between a1 and
the traditional technology's marginal pro
ductivity is higher (the marginal product

a;;,

curves are linear, corresponding to qua
dratic production functions that seem to
perform well in empirical studies of water
productivity).
Figure 1 suggests that when the price of

water relative to the price of output is
smaller than (w/p)l, profit-maximizing
fanners use less water and realize more
output using modern rather than tradi
tional technology. When the price of water
is high, modern technology may require

more water but produces much more out
put than does the traditional technology.
Under both technologies, profit is the rev
enues minus water costs and fixed costs.

Modern technology increases yields and is
likely to save water but involves higher
investment costs. Caswell and Zilberman
(1986) and Dinar and Zilberman (1991)
argue that modern technologies' yield-in
creasing and water~saving effects are
likely to offset the higher investment costs
as water price becomes higher. Figure 2
. depicts profit per acre under both technol
ogies as a function of water price. When
water price is smaller than WI, the tradi
tional technology is more profitable; how~
ever, when water price is between WI and
w2, the modern technology is more profit~
able. Thus, farmers are more likely to
adopt modem technologies when facing
higher water prices.
Under the prior appropriation system,
the farmer undertakes expense to move

FlGURE2

Profitability of Different Technologies
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water from the canal or stream to the field

but does not pay for the water's scarcity
value. Thus. one assumes water's mar
ginal price to be zero (or close to it). There
fore, profit-maximiZing farmers use water
at a level where the value of marginal
product of applied water is zero or very
close to it. Figure 2 clearly reveals that
under these circumstances farmers are
likely to adopt the traditional technology
and use water per acre equal to ali.
Suppose that the region has a given
amount of water, A, and the total amount
of agricultural acres is A/alt. Under the
traditional technology in the prior appro
priation system, yield-maximizing water

use per acre detennines irrigated acreage
from a given source. Water planners and
irrigation experts refer to a crop's "water
requirement." This level corresponds to
aJ, i.n figure 1. Obviously, the higher the
water requirement, the lower the acreage
that a given water source can irrigate. In
the past, each time the water capacity for
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a given source was exhausted, the govern
ment or a group of farmers exploited an
other water source and distributed the
water among fanners according to crop
water requirements. That procedure led to
the water system seen in many regions,
especially in the East San Joaquin Valley.
Water markets establish a water price.
Fanners apply water at a level so that the
value of marginal product of applied
water is equal to water price. If water price
is positive, then water use per acre de
clines relative to the prior appropriation
system where water price is zero. Thus,
introducing water markets should in
crease the amount of land that a given vol
ume of regional water can serve. The in
troduction of a water market may expand
irrigated land to include all fann land in
the region.
If only the traditional technology is
available, water use per acre under the
water market is equal to AIL (total
waterI available land) and water price cor

responds to point E in figure 2 (assuming
that the price at E is the value of marginal
product when water per acre is AIL).
When more than one technology is avail
able, different outcomes are possible. First,
if the ratio AIL is relatively large and the
resulting water price is smaller than w t in
figure 2, then all farmers use the tradi
tional technology. Alternatively, when
water is scarce and AIL is relatively small
so that water price is greater than w2 in
figure 2, all farmers use the modem tech
nology. A third possible outcome results
when water price is between w t and w2 in
figure 2. In this case, some farmers adopt
the modem technology, and others adopt
the traditional technology. The marginal
physical product of applied water is iden
tical in both firms and is equal to (wi p)2
in figure 1. However, the traditional tech
nology requires more water than does the
modem technology. Obviously, using both
technologies makes the quasi rent per acre
(the difference between the revenue and
water cost) equal under both technologies.
Farmers use only the traditional tech
nology under the market when the water
per acre ratio is relatively high and water
use per acre is relatively close to ali. The
efficiency gain associated with moving
from water rights to a market system re
sults from being able to cultivate more
land with a given amount of water. That
is, moving water that has a relatively low
marginal productivity on the land used
under the prior appropriation system to
land that has not be utilized before in
creases water productivity on this new
land. (Alternatively, some excess water
can be moved from agriculture and used
in other activities having high marginal
productivities). Adopting modern tech
nology enhances water productivity of
water even further but entails higher in
vestment costs. If extra acreage beyond
what was settled under the prior appro
priation system is minimal, the productiv
ity gain associated with adopting the
modern technology may be so insignifi

cant that adoption is unlikely. If the water
per acre ratio is relatively small, farmers
likely will apply the modem technology
on aU land. In this case, the water price is
relatively high, a large increase in output
occurs, and water use per acre drastically
declines. A middle solution may occur
when a water market increases the land base
but the productivity gain is not sufficient to
justify completely adopting the modem
technology. In this case, fanners use the
modem technology on some land and the
traditional technology on other land consis
tent with market-dearing rules.
The analysis here suggests that transi
tion from a water rights regime to a water
market increases economic efficiency. This
is true if the transition from one system to
another does not entail adjustment costs.
However, the prior appropriation system
and the zero scarcity value of water it en
tails permit establishing a very inexpen
sive water conveyance system requiring
little monitoring, especially if all land be
longs to farmers who have water rights.
Transition to a water market may require
expanding conveyance systems, improv
ing measuring and metering, and increas
ing monitoring and protection of water
flows. If the efficiency gain from operating
the new system is smaller than the adjust
ment costs of the transition, then the tran
sition is not totally efficient. Indeed, lack
of demand, low commodity prices, or a
high initial water to land ratio may mean
the amount of land that farmers optimally
can utilize under a market is not much
bigger than the amount they utilized
under the prior appropriation system. In
this case, the prior appropriation system
is more efficient than a market, given tran
sition costs. That may be why the system
was established in the first place. Over
time, as demand for commodities pro
duced with water increases and their
prices rise, or as adjustment costs improve
due to better technology, water markets
are likely to become more efficient, and
one can justify transition.

With transition to a water market, the
farmer who had a right to water under
prior appropriation now must purchase it,
perhaps from a government agency. Obvi
ously, the farmer loses therefore likely op~
poses the transition. Ameliorating the sit
uation may involve introducing "transfer
able rights," which allow farmers with se
nior rights to sell excess water to farmers
whose land is not included under the prior
appropriation system. Farmers with prior
appropriation rights now benefit from the
transition and are less likely to oppose it.
Of course, exceptions exist. For example,
if the elasticity of demand for the com
modities produced by farmers is low, se
nior rights owners may object that the
transition would expand production, re
duce output prices, and reduce their in
come. Realistically, that probably is not the
case. Such objections seem unlikely if ad
justment costs associated with transition
to a market system are sufficiently low
and farmers enjoying senior rights under
the existing regime are confident that they
will be able to retain these rights, transfer
water, and gain income. The California
Farm Bureau is not opposed to introduc
ing institutions like transferable rights.
Shah and Zilberman (1992) base their
numerical example on parameters from
the California cotton industry and assume
that relatively light soils and uneven land
characterize the geography. Table 1 shows
some of their results along with parameter
values. Four irrigation technologies are
available: furrow, shortened runs, sprink
ler, and drip. The first two may be rela
tively inefficient-especially at locations
with sandy soils and uneven land-and
are traditional technologies. The latter two
are modem technologies having higher ir
rigation efficiency and higher set-up and
other fixed costs (table 1).
The example uses a hypothetical case of
a region with 3 million acre feet (MAP) of
water. Computer simulations obtain input
use and output allocations for both prior
appropriation and market mechanisms.

Under the prior appropriation system,
only 720,000 acres are utilized when out~
put price is $0.75/lb. This price and the
corresponding queuing output serve as
benchmark values around which demand
elasticity varies from 1 to 50. If the adjust
ment costs are relatively low ($5.00/ AF)
and demand for cotton is elastic, transi
tion to a water market permits utilizing
the land in all cases, even when 1,100,000
acres are available. However, as the
water/land ratio becomes smaller, the
dominant technology in the region be
comes more advanced. For instance,
when the region has 1,050,000 acres of
land and the demand elasticity for cotton
is 50, farmers use sprinkler irrigation
throughout the region. In this case, tran
sition increases the irrigated land base
by about 46 percent and social welfare
by about 24 percent.
Demand elasticity is an important ele
ment in this analysis. The higher the elas
ticity, the greater the likelihood that farm
ers utilize the more advanced technologies
for a given amount of land, and the greater
the benefit from transition to a wa ter mar~
ket system. Shah and Zilberman also show
that even though adjustment costs are im
portant from a conceptual standpoint, the
level of costs that would make a transition
to a water market system inefficient is sub
stantial.
Shah and Zilberman elaborate on the
case with zero adjustment costs. In the hy
pothetical example, if water availability to
the region declines by 25 percent and a
transition occurs from water rights to a
water market, the farmers' well-being
under the water market is the same as
under the prior appropriation system.
Thus, great potential exists for transfer
ring nonagricultural water without reduc
ing farmers' well-being if the transfer also
involves transition to a water market. Ob
viously, the higher the transition's adjust
ment costs, the less water is available for
transfer away from agriculture.

TABLEt
Tecllnology

lnigation Efficiency

Fixed Cost

Furrow (l)

0.•

500

Shortened-Run (2)

0.7

517

Sprinkler (3)

0.8

548

Drip (4)

0.95

633

Land Base (10) acres)
Demand Elasticity

900
1

900
SO

10SO
1

10SO
SO

Queuing Outcomes
Output (10 6 lbs.)

93.

93.

93.

93.

Output Price (S/Ib.)

0.75

0.75

0.75

0.75

Irrigated Land (let acres)

720

720

720

720

Market

Outcom~

Adju51mmt Costs - $S/acrr
Output (106 Ibs.)

1159

1161

1161

1344

Output Price ($/Ib.)

o.sn

0.746

0.57

0.744

Waler Price (5/ AF)

62.0

73.75

63.7

118.4

lITigated Land (lef acres)

900

900

902

10SO

2

2-3

2

3

5.4$

16.3%

Technologies
Percent Gain in Social Welfare

Shah and Zilberman abstract from
many issues. They consider only three
technological alternatives to traditional ir
rigation-short run, sprinkler.. and drip
ignoring the great potential for water sav
ings and yield increases associated with,
for example, irrigation scheduJing. They
do not consider crop substitution as a re·
sponse to a high water price. A transition
away (rom water-consuming crops to
other crops that bring higher profits per

5.4.~

23.8%

acre foot of water also deserves consider
ation. Nevertheless, Shah and Zilberman
establish the potential gain from moving to
a market system that overcomes the ineffi
ciency of a prior appropriation system.
Moreover, for 25 percent of the irrigators
who use surface water, the allocation does
not exactly follow the prior appropriation
system. Those irrigators receive water from
the state and federal water projects and are,
in effect, water project contractors.

IV.

WATER CONTRACTING

Water contractors, like prior appropria·
tors, cannot trade their water, but period
ically can renegotiate their contracts. In
principle, contract prices were designed to
repay project costs. While SWP prices are
high (sometimes reaching $80 per acre
foot), historically the CVP water has been
cheap and highly subsidized. Some who
receive water from the federal water proj
ect have been unable to receive all the
water they want at the subsidized prices.
Moore et al. (1992) document that the
shadow price of water used by the con
tractors, at least in the late 1980s, was
much higher than the price paid. Thus,
federal and state water project contractors'
behavior renects the positive price of
water. Therefore, their water application
per acre is lower and their water e((jciency
is higher than are those of the prior appro
priators who, in many cases, experienced
water prices dose to zero.
Furthermore, water contractors' rights
are junior to the prior appropriators' rights.
Therefore, the contractors are further down
the queue. Whenever a severe drought or
water shortage occurs, the contractors' sup
plies are more likely to be cut than are those
of many farmers who are prior appropria·
tors. For example, the 1990-1991 drought
did not affect the supply of water to many
prior appropriators while many contractors
received. between 25 to 50 percent of their
usual water allotment.
Much evidence suggest's that water
project contractors use water more effi
ciently than do prior appropriators. For
example, the State Water Resources Con
trol Board shows that in 1989, CVP-con
tracting cotton growers in the Westlands
Water District used about 20 percent less
water and gained about 20 percent more
output than did the Valley growers who
likely are prior appropriators. Mac
Dougall et aI. (1992) find that fanners in
the Broadview Water District use 20 per·
cent less water for the same yields as do
nearby fanners in the Central California

Irrigation District. Differences in land
quality or other fanning conditions in the
two regions are small. Therefore, higher
water price led to the water savings. Fur
thermore, some of the water districts like
Broadview have introduced tiered pricing
to encourage fanners to adopt modem ir
rigation technologies and conserve water.
Indeed, the first farmers to use drip irri
gation in cotton production were state or
federal project contractors. Similarly,
water-project water recipients are more
likely to adopt irrigation scheduling and
other water·saving managerial practices.
Patterns of water transactions depend
upon the participants in the water market.
If trading is limited to agriculture, contrac
tors will purchase water from prior appro
priators. If the market includes urban sec
tors, prior appropriators will be sellers,
cities will be buyers, and contractors may
be either buyers or sellers. If the environ
ment is an autonomous player in the mar·
ket with the capacity to purchase water, it
also will be a water buyer. Understanding
transaction patterns is especially impor·
tant for analyzing the impact of new water
quality regulations in California.
V.

WATER MARKETS THAT REDUCE COSTS OF
MEETING WATER OUAUTY GOALS

Concern for water quality in the San
Francisco Bay and Delta is leading state
and federal agencies to consider new
water quality standards requiring diver
sion of more water to environmental uses.
Because environmental quality is a public
good in the economic sense, the Mfree
rider problem is likely to cause un
derprovision of private funds to purchase
water for environmental purposes. There·
fore, government intervention is needed.
Current fiscal constraints prevent the gov·
ernment from allocating funds to purchase
water for environmental uses. Instead, the
government has considered and enacted
policies to divert some of the government·
supplied water to environmental use.
Government agencies also considered es
N

tablishing new water quality standards re
quiring more water diversion from agri
cultural to environmental uses.
The recently enacted Central Valley Im
provement Act (Bradley-Miller Bill) man
dates reallocating 800,000 AF of CVP
water from agricultural contractors so as
to improve San Francisco Bay and Delta
water quality. Allowing water transfer be
tween the CVP contractors (and thus es
tablishing a water market) complements
this reallocation.
The act has the ingredients of a desir
able reform. The efficiency gain associated
with introducing markets will save some
of the cost as with water supply reduction.
This and similar proposals such as the de
feated Johnston Bill calling for transfer of
2.5 MAF from the contractors to environ
mental uses are relatively easy to imple
ment because state and federal govern
ments supply the water to contractors.
However, such proposals have limited po
tential for improving welfare. Contractors
are likely to use water more efficiently
than do prior appropriators. Contractors
consume less than 30 percent of California
surface water. Therefore, efficiency gains
from introdUcing a water market solely
among contractors are limited. If water is
to be taken away from contractors, effi
cient reform must establish a water market
that includes all agricultural users-con
tractors and prior appropriators. Indeed,
policies that significantly reduce water
supplied to contractors will be very costly
outside an agricultural water market.
Zilberman et at (1993) use several ap
proaches to estimate impacts on agricul
tural income of reassigning water from
CVP contractors to environmental uses
while allOWing water trading between
contractors. (Measuring impacts on eco
nomic surplus may be more appropriate,
but policymakers are interested in impacts
on revenue and employment growth.) To
find the upper bound on short term im
pacts, Zilberman et al. consider that the
response to water supply reduction will be

fallOWing of land used with low-value
crops. Figures 3, 4, and 5 depict revenues
per acre foot as a function of the cumula
tive volume of water applied in three re
gions receiving water from the Central
Valley Project. The Westlands Water Dis
trict and the Friant-Kern region are south
of the Delta, and the Tehama-Colusa is
north of the Delta. The figures show great
variability in revenues associated with
water used on different crops in different
regions. Water used with high-value tree
crops generates more than $1,000 per acre
foot, but water used with low-value crops
such as pasture and alfalfa generates very
low revenues. Regions south of the Delta
regions tend to generate, higher revenues
per acre than does Tehama-Colusa, whose
return structure resembles those of many
prior appropriators located in the north
east Central Valley.
The income reductions associated with
reducing supply to CVP contractors is
likely to be different if the reductions
apply to all contractors or only to contrac
tors south of the Delta. If the reform affects
all contractors and allows trading between
them, the 0.8 MAF reduction that the
Bradley-Miller Bill calls for mostly will re
duce acreage devoted to hay, irrigated pas
ture, and rice, crops which generate less
than $100/ AF. Restricting reductions to
growers in Westlands and other nearby
districts will reduce the coUon acreage
that generates more than $250/AF in rev
enues. Similarly, reducing 2.5 million AF
of water among all Bureau contractors will
reduce the fallowing of rice, sorghum,
wheat, and hay acreage and some fallow
ing of cotton. If the reduction applies only
to contractors south of the Delta, most of
the land for cotton will be fallowed as well
as some land for almonds. Thus, extend
ing the range of producers that the water
supply reduction affects drastically re
duces the economic implications.
Zilberman et al. (1993) estimate that re
ducing the water supply to CVP contrac
tors by 0.8 MAF as suggested by the Brad·

FIGURE 3
Friant Unit Earnings per AF of Applied Water and Cumulative
Water Usage (AF), by' Crop for 1990
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FIGURE 4
Westlands Water District Earnings per AF of Applied Water
and Cumulative Water Usage (AF), by Crop for 1990
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ley-Miller Bill will reduce their revenues
by $50-$120 and will lose 2,000 to 4,000
man-years of employment annually. Fur
thermore, reducing 2.5 MAF in agricul
tural water supply to CVP water contrac
tors would lead to an estimated annual
revenue loss of between $400 million and
$780 million and a loss of between 10,000
to 19,000 man-years of work. The impacts
would be much less significant if the water
transfer occurs in conjunction with the in
troduction and encouragement of water
transfers between regions and with the de
velopment of new conveyance facilities to
ensure efficient water use across the state.
Actually, transferring a substantial
amount of water from agriculture to the
environment in California, introducing
transferrable rights, and creating an agri
cultural water market may cause contrac
tors to buy water and prior appropriators
to adopt improved irrigation technologies
and use less water more efficiently. Cali
fornia agriculture uses about 20 MAP of
surface water annually. The analysis here
suggests that transferring 10 percent of
this water from agriculture and introduc
ing a water market (that is, allowing trans
ferrable water rights) may not leave Cali
fornia farmers worse off. Of course, such
reform is complex and must address other
issues, including managing groundwater
and third-party effects as well as develop
ing compensation mechanisms to ensure
that none of the major parties in the state
are big losers and that transition impacts
are equitably divided.
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